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INTRODUCTION
I
H
The STS-5_ Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload
activitie_ as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB), Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine
(SSME) systems performance during the sixty-second flight of the Space Shuttle
Program and sixth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition
to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET designated as ET-63; three
SSME's which were designated as serial numbers 2028, 2033, and 2018 in positions
I, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-065. The
RSRMs that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360W037A (welterweight)
for the left SRB, and 360H037B (heavyweight) for the right SRB.
This STS-59 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That
document requires that each major organizational element supporting the Program
report the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance plus
identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objective of the STS-59 mission was to successfully perform the
operations of the Space Radar Laboratory-I (SRL-I). The secondary objectives of
this flight were to perform the operations of the Space Tissue Loss-A (STL-A)
and STL-B payloads, the Visual Function Tester-4 (VFT-4) payload, the Shuttle
Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II) experiment, the Consortium for Materials
Development in Space Complex Autonomous Payload-IV (CONCAP-IV), and the three
Get-Away Special (GAS) payloads.
The STS-59 mission was planned as a nominal 9-day + 1-day mission with
2 contingency days available should Orbiter contingency operations or weather
avoidance be required. The sequence of events for the STS-59 mission is shown
in Table I, and the official Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is
shown in Table II. The official Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Problem
Tracking List is shown in Table III, and the MSFC Problem Tracking List is shown
in Table IV. In addition, the Integration and Payload in-flight anomalies are
referenced in the applicable sections of the report. Appendix A lists the
sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used in the preparation of
this document. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations
used in this document. All times are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as
well as mission elapsed time (MET).
The six-person crew for this sixty-second flight of the Space Shuttle Program
consisted of Sidney M. Gutierrez, Col., U. $. Air Force_ Commander_ Kevin P.
Chilton, Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot; Jerome Apt, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission
Specialist 1; Michael Richard Clifford, Lt. Col., U. S. Army, Mission
Specialist 2; Linda M. Godwin, Ph.D., Civilian, Payload Commander and Mission
Specialist 3; and Thomas D. Jones, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 4.
STS-59 was the third space flight for Mission Specialist I, the second space
flight for the Commander, Pilot, Mission Specialist 2, and Mission Specialist 3;
and the first space flight for the Mission Specialist 4.
MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-59 mission was scheduled for liftoff at 8:06 a.m.e.d.t, on April 8,
1994; however, the weather conditions were not acceptable for launch. The
STS-59 countdown proceeded nominally up to the T-9 minute hold, which was
lengthened because of the overcast cloud conditions existing at the launch site
at the planned launch time. Late in the 2.5-hour launch window, the cloud
conditions became acceptable; however, increased wind speeds accompanied the
clearing conditions. As the launch window closed, the winds were such that
crosswinds at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) were in excess of the 15-knot
limit should a Return-to-Launch-Site (RTLS) abort be required. As a result, the
launch was scrubbed and rescheduled for Saturday, April 9, 1994, at
7:05 a.m.e.d.t.
The launch countdown for the second launch attempt proceeded nominally with no
unplanned holds. The on-time liftoff of STS-59 for a 57-degree inclination
orbit occurred at 099:11:05:00.020 G.m.t. (7:05 a.m.e.d.t, on April 9, 1994).
There were no significant anomalies during the ascent phase.
All SSME and RSEM start sequences occurred as expected and the launch phase
performance was nominal in all respects. SRB separation, entry, deceleration,
and water impact occurred as anticipated, with both SRBs being succes_fully
recovered. Performance of the SSMEs, ET, and main propulsion system (MPS) was
normal. An evaluation of the vehicle performance during ascent was made using
vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion data. From these data, the
average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) for the time period between
SRB separation and 3-E throttling was 452.0 seconds as compared to an MPS tag
value of 452.77 seconds.
Following ascent, the auxiliary power unit (APU) 2 lube oil return temperature
increased above the 250 "F nominal control temperature due to anomalous water
spray boiler (WSB) 2 performance. When the APU 2 lube oil return temperature
reached 305 OF, the crew switched from the WSB 2A to the 2B controller, and when
the temperature reached 323 °F, APU 2 was shut down. No indication of WSB 2
cooling was noted. Also, the lube oll return temperature for APU 3 reached
283 °F before WSB 3 cooling was noted. Cooling began while still operating on
the WSB 3A controller and the expected over-coollng condition occurred and was
followed by nominal operation.
The orbital maneuvering suosystem (OMS) -I maneuver was not required because of
the direct insertion trajectory that was flown. The OMS-2 maneuver was
performed at 099:11:40:10.3 (00:00:35:10.3 MET). The maneuver duration was
100.2 seconds and the _V was 163.5 ft/sec. The resultant orbit was 121.3 by
120.5 nmi.
The first orblt-adjust firing was performed at 099:15:10:00 G.m.t.
(00:04105:00 MET) using two +X reaction control subsystem (RCS) thrusters.
13.4-second firing produced a _V of 3.2 ft/sec.
The
f
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The mission design established the STS-59 mission as a 9-day ÷ 1-day
+ 2-contingency-day mission. In light of this, the "go" was given during flight
day 1 activities for an additional day on-orbit, extending STS-59 to a lO-day
mission..
A second orbit-adjust firing was performed at I00:12:04:00 G.m.t.
(01:00:59:00 MET). The multi-axis RCS firing lasted 15.048 seconds and resulted
in a _V of 3.7 ft/sec.
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The third orbit adjust firing was performed at 102:11:30 G.m.t. (03:00:25 MET).
The firing was 14.02 seconds in duration and provided a aV of 3.3 ft/sec.
The fourth orbit adjust firing was performed at 104:13:46 G.m.t. (05:02:41 MET).
The 13-second firing was retrograde in direction and provided a _V of
3.1 ft/sec.
APU 2 was used for flight control system (FCS) checkout, starting at
107:14:43 G.m.t. (08:03:38 MET). APU run-time was 12 minutes 2 seconds and
25 Ib of fuel were consumed. All APU subsystem parameters were nominal during
the checkout. About 7 minutes 47 seconds after APU start, lube oil spray
cooling with the WSB 2B controller occurred when the lube oil return temperature
reached 250 °F, and no obvious over-temperature or delay in cooling was noted.
Approximately 2 1/2 minutes after cooling began, the crew switched to the WSB 2A
controller and cooling was nominal. As a result of this successful test, WSB 2
was used for entry with no constraints.
The RCS hot-flre test began at 107:15:08:25 G.m.t. (08:04:03:25 MET) and ended
at 107:15:14:10 (08:04:09:10 MET). A review of the thruster data indicated
satisfactory operation of all thrusters.
The third fuel cell purge of the mission was performed at 107:22:04 G.m.t.
(08:10:59 MET), 96 hours after the second purge. This was the first time in the
Space Shuttle Program that the maximum interval of 96 hours has been achieved.
The performance decay was 0.2 volt on each fuel cell.
All stowage activities in preparation for entry were completed for the first
landing opportunity of the first scheduled landing day. The payload bay doors
were closed at 109:12:14:55 G.m.t. (10:01:09:55 MET) with dual-motor times noted
for both doors and all latches.
The first planned landing opportunity at 11:51 a.m.e.d.t, on April 19, 1994,
at the SLF, was waived because of the cloud conditions in the SLF area. The
second opportunity was also waived because of the unfavorable and dynamic
weather conditions in the landing area as well as potential crosswind violations
at the SLF. As a result, the landing was planned for April 20, 1994, at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) (weather permitting) or Edwards Air Force Base. The payload
bay doors were reopened at 109:16:39:20 G.m.t. (10:05:34:20 MET).
All deorbit preparation activities for the second landing day opportunity were
completed, and the payload bay doors were closed at II0:iI:51_49 G.m.t.
(11:00:46:49 MET). The first landing opportunity at KSC was waived because of
no-go weather conditions, m,d the landing was retargeted for Edwards Air Force
Base on the following orbit.
3
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The deorbit maneuver for the first landing opportunity at Edwards Air Force Base
was initiated at 110:16:00:34.9 G.m.t. (11:04:55:34.9 MET). The maneuver was
approximately 135 seconds in duration and the _V was 234.5 ft/sec. Entry
interface occurred at 110:16:22:11G.m.t. (11:05:17:11 MET).
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at the Edwards Air Force Base on concrete
runway 22 at 110:16:54:30 G.m.t. (11:05:49:30 MET) on April 20, 1994. The
Orbiter drag chute was deployed satisfactorily at 110:16:54:41 G.m.t., and nose
landing gear touchdown occurred 4 seconds after drag chute deployment. The drag
chute was jettisoned at 110:16:55:12 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at
110:16:55:23 G.m.t. With the exception of greater-than-average main landing
gear tire wear, the rollout was nor,nal in all respects. The flight duration was
II days 05 hours 49 minutes 30 seconds.
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PAYLOADS
The payloads for the STS-59 mission consisted of the Space Radar Laboratory-l,
thc Space Tissue Loss-A and -B Experiments, the Visual Function Tester-4, the
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II, the Consortium for Materials Development in
Space Complex Autonomous Payload-IV, and three Getaway Special (GAS)
experiments.
SPACE RADAR LABO_ATORY-I
The Space Radar Laboratory-I consisted of a set of dedicated Earth observation
payloads that were used to study vegetation, hydrology, tectonics, topography,
and global air pollution. The SRL-I instruments performed exceptionally well
during the ll-day mission. The Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (SIR-C) performed
flawlessly throughout the entire mission, as did the X-band Synthetic Aperture
Radar (X-SAR) after a problem encountered during activation was resolved.
The Payload High Rate Recorders (PHRRs) performed well, even though some
procedural modifications were required before the recorders would operate
properly. The Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) sub-experiment also performed
flawlessly and was a complete success. The strategy to follow the pre-mission
ground track was executed so well that the last radar data takes occurred within
one-half minute of the pre-mission planned time, and the look angle of the radar
changed less than 0.5 degree from the planned.
The radar experiments had approximately 97-percent successful data takes when
compared with the number planned. Of the more than 400 sites where data were
planned to be taken during the mission, 19 sites were designated as
"supersites." A 99-percent success rate was achieved in collecting data from
the "supersites." The radar experiments produced over 94 hours of radar data
recorded on 165 digital data tapes on the PHRRs. These data consist of swaths
taken over 44 countries during 850 data-takes, and these data cover an area in
excess of 43.75 million square miles (70 million square kilometers).
The high-rate downlink and subsequent data flow to the Mission Control Center
(MCC) and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) worked very well. The JPL ground
products system processed approximately 20 scenes using the hlgh-precision
processor, three scenes using data from all three frequencies, and five special
products. Numerous X-SAR X-band passes were produced on the real-time processor
and special image products for display and evaluation were produced.
Anomalies that were identified in the SRL-I were the failure of one C-band panel
(out of 18), the failed X-SAR circuit that provides protection to the high-power
amplifier, the PHRR 1 crinkling tape problem, and transient commanding problems
with the PHRRs. The C-band panel will probably be replaced between flights, the
failed X-SAR circuit will be examined during turnaround activities to determine
whether to fly as-is or repair, and the PHRR problems will be evaluated for
corrective action.
The Measurement of Air Pollution from Satellites (MAPS) experiment also
performed flawlessly. The MAPS experimenters were pleased with the stability of
,
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the pallet Freon loop, which provided superb instrument thermal stability
throughout the mission. The mission concluded with 211 hours of MAPS data.
Their mission was lO0-percent successful.
%
SPACE TISSUE LOSS/NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH - CELLS
The Space Tissue Loss/National Institute of Health - Cells (STL/NIH-C)
experiment provided data on the effects of microgravity on muscle, bone, and
endothelial cells to validate models of biochemical and functional loss induced
by microgravity stress. The STL experiment evaluated cytoskeleton, metabolism,
membrane integrity and protease activity in target cells, in addition to testing
tissue-loss pharmaceuticals for efficacy.
The STL-A and STL-B parts of the STL/NIH-C experiment were initialized on flight
day 1 as planned and were configured for entry on flight day I0 as planned.
Temperature readings throughout the flight indicated that both units performed
nominally. Real-tlme downllnk video from the STL-B internal microscope
demonstrated a new scientific capability to monitor on-orbit sample status
without major impacts to the crew timeline. Additional video of the contents of
STL-B was recorded onboard for postflight evaluation. The crew also downlinked
a video tutorial of the STL/NIH-C activities and objectives.
VISUAL FUNCTION TESTER-4
The VFT-4 experiment measured the near and far point of clear vision of the
human eye, as well as the ability of the eye to change focus within the range of
vision.
The daily VFT-4 data-takes were completed by the crew as expected. No anomalies
were identified with the equipment. On two occasions (flight day I and 6), the
crew provided a downlink video tutorial of the VFT-4 operations.
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT-If
The SAREX-II was used to communicate on the two-meter amateur radio band with
schools and radio operators around the world. All school contacts planned for
this mission were successfully accomplished using the SAREX-II radio equipment.
The American Radio Relay League/Amateur Radio Satellite Corporation (ARRL/AMSAT)
reported that there was more press coverage on this flight than for any previous
flight. The school contacts included St. Bernard High School in Playa Del Rey,
California; Kanawha Elementary School in Davisville, West Virginia; Anthony
Elementary School in Anthony, Kansas; Deep Creek Middle School in Baltimore,
Maryland; Ealy Elementary in West Bloomfield, Michigan; Country Club School in
San Ramon, California; Paltama Senior High School in Paltama, Finland; 0gilvie
School in Northhampton, Australia: and the Boy Scouts from Alcetal School in
Richardson, Texas. On April 13, using _elebridge connections, the crew wished
the Mir (Russian Spacecraft) a belated "Happy Cosmonaut's Day". Also, on
April 15, 1994, the crew spoke with Astronauts Bonnie Dunbar and Ken Cameron in
Star City, Russia.
o_
__ _ _;_.
CONSORTIUM FOR MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT IN SPACE COMPLEX AUTONOMOUS PAYLOAD-IV
The CONCAP-IV was contained in a standard GAS canister mounted on a GAS bridge
assembly in the payload bay. The CONCAP-IV grew crystals and thin films through
physical vapor transport, and provided for a cox_tinuation of this experiment
which has been flown on previous Space Shuttle flights.
The CONCAP-IV was initialized on flight day I as planned. Final operations to
purge the system with nitrogen and deactivat_ were performed on flight day I0 in
preparation for entry. Postflight analysis will determine the success of this
experiment.
GETAWAY SPECIALS
Activation of all GAS canisters was completed on flight day I at
099:17:22 G.m.t. (00:06:17 MET). Deactivation of the G-20 _ GAS canister
(Freezing and Crystallization of Water in Spaceflight) occurred on flight day 1
at 099:19:10:25 G.m.t (00:08:05:25 MET). The second GAS canister to be
deactivated was G-300 (Thermal Conductivity Measurements on Liquids in
Microgravity) and that occurred on flight day 4 at 102:18:37:30 G.m.t.
(03:07:32:30 MET). The third GAS canister, G-458 (Microgravity's Influence on
Small Fruiting Bodies) was deactivated on flight day 9 at 107:22:00:35 G.m.t.
(08:10:55:35 MET). Success of all three GAS experiments will be determined
through postflight analysis, and the results will be published in other
documentation.
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC)
or Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (0MRSD)
violations occurred.
Analysis of the flight data indicates nominal performance of all SRB subsystems.
A 2-percent rise in the left SRB tilt hydraulic reservoir fluid level (3 seconds
in duration) was noted during the prelaunch gimbal test following hydraulic
power-up and the initial drop in reservoir fluid level. The level was nominal
for the remainder of the flight, although minor fluctuations were noted during
the roll maneuver. This response has been seen on previous flights, and appears
to be a characteristic of the thrust vector control (TVC) system during startup
or a small amount of air trapped in the system. The characteristic had no
adverse effect on systems performance.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the ET at 126.14 seconds after
liftoff. Reports from the recovery area, based on visual sightings, indicat
that the deceleration subsystems performed as designed. Both SRBs were
recovered and returned through Port Canaveral to KSC for inspection and
refurbishment.
During the postflight inspection, an in-flight anomaly was noted when the KbNA
was found separated from the Hypalon and primer at the booster separation motor
(BSM) support brackets on the right and left aft skirts (Flight Problem
STS-59-B-01).
The inspection also revealed an indentation in the instafoam on the forward face
of the right External Tank attachment (ETA) ring near the aft integrated
electronics assembly (IEA) cover (Flight Problem STS-S9-I-02).
REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
The prelaunch countdown RSRM performance was satisfactory with no LCC or OM_RSD
violations.
Power up and operation of the field-joint and igniter-joint heaters were
accomplished routinely. The field-joint heaters operated for 11 hours 9 minutes
(21 percent of the LCC time frame) to maintain the field joints in their normal
operating temperature range. The igniter-joint heaters operated for 17 hours
45 minutes (41 percent of the LCC time frame) to maintain the igniter joints in
their normal operating temperature range.
For this flight, the low-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was
operated intermittently for 5 hours 49 minutes to maintain the case/nozzle-jolnt
temperatures within the required LCC ranges. The purge was changed to high
pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt prior to launch. As a result of the purge
operation, the calculated flex bearing mean bulk temperature was an acceptable
82 OF.
/
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Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMs was well within the
allowable performance envelopes, and was typical of the performance observed on
previous flights. The following table shows some _f the more significant RSRM
flight data based on the propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) of 71 °F.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse ga_es
1-20, I06 Ibf-sec
1-60, 106 ibf-sec
I-AT, I0-_Ibf-sec
i
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/ibm
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec @ 71 °F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds a
Ignitionbinterval
Web time
Separation 50 psia
Action time _ue'
Separation command
PMBT, OF
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psiallO ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff imbalance impulse
differential, Klbf-sec
Left motor_ 71 °F
Predicted
65.99
175.76
297.03
268.50
0.3694
0.3723
Actual
65.95
174.92
296.21
267.80
0.3691
0.3718
NIA
109.5
118.9
121.0
124.1
Predicted
Right motor_ 71 °F
Actual
66.12
176.06
297.02
268.50
0.3699
0.3728
0.233
109.2
118.9
121.0
123.8
0.229
109.0
118.7
120.7
123.6
65.87
174.86
296.60
268.20
N/A
109.0
119.1
120.9
124.1
71.00 71.00 71.00 71.00
90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
2.8 2.8 2.8 2.5
Actual
88.7 c
0.3689
0.3717
Predicted
N/A
Notes:
a Times are referenced to ignition command time.
b Those items are referenced to lift-off time (ignition interval).
c Impulse imbalance - left motor - right motor
Postflight inspection of the motors indicated nominal performance. However, a
gas path was found through the left-hand nozzle-to-case Joint polysulfide at the
204-degree location. Soot was observed up up to the wiper 0-ring from the
202-degree to 210-degree locations. No soot or heat effects were observed past
the wiper O-ring. The wiper O-ring was eroded a maximum of O.O08-inch deep at
the gas-path location. Gas paths through the nozzle-to-case joint polysulflde
have been observed on five previous RSRM flight motors. There was no heat
effect to metal parts or the primary O-ring. Testing and analysis have verified
that the nozzle-to-case joint can tolerate the occurrence of a single
polysulfide gas path aligned with a wiper 0-ring defect, and a worst-case
thermal analysis has verified that the joint is fail-safe for multiple gas paths
through the polysulfide and wiper O-ring.
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation functioned
satisfactorily. ET purge and heater operations were monitored and all performed
properly. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
The nose-cone purge heater and temperature control system operated successfully.
The primary controller failed at the start of the nose-cone purging; therefore,
the secondary controller was used throughout the entire nose-cone purge
procedure. The primary-controller power relay was jumpered during the L-3 hour
hold, allowing the controller to be used as a backup should the secondary
controller have failed.
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during each countdown.
There was no observed ice or frost on the acreage areas of the ET. Nominal
quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid
nitrogen (LH2) feedlines and on the pressurization line brackets. These
observations were acceptable per NSTS 08303. No anomalous thermal protection
system (TPS) conditions were noted during the final walk-down inspection
performed _y the Ice/Frost Red Team.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum L0 2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure
slump was 14.4 psid.
ET separation was confirmed, and the ET was photographed by the crew after
separation. The Development Test Objective section contains a detailed
discussion of the results of the ET photography. The postfllght predicted
impact point was approximately 111 nmi. uprange of the preflight prediction.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
The postponement of the launch for one day enabled the inspection of the high
pressure oxidizer preburner pump volute vanes, and these were found satisfactory
for flight, All tanking and prelaunch preparations were completed
satisfactorily.
All SSME parameters appeared to be normal throughout both prelaunch countdowns
and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine
ready was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and
thrust buildup were normal.
All Interface Control Document (ICD) start and shutdown transient requirements
were met with the exception of total propellant consumption during the start of
SSME 3. SSME 3 (sln 2018) exceeded the maximum allowable total propellant
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consumption during start by 102 Ibm. The violation is attributed to the time
required to meet steady-state requirements; however, the time from engine start
to steady-state thrust was 4.68 seconds, which is within the ICD limits.
Flight da_a indicate that SSME performance during mainstage, throttling,
shutdown, and propellant dumping operations was normal. Engine cutoff times for
SSME I, 2, and 3 were 519.37, 519.48, and 519.60 seconds, respectively. The
specific impulse (Is_) was rated as 452.01 seconds based on trajectory data,
Space Shuttle main efigine cutoff (MEC0) occurred 513.0 seconds after liftoff.
The high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were well within
specification throughout engine operation. The SSME 3 channel A and channel B
differential temperature (aT) for the high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP)
turbine discharge was greater than 200 °F (Flight Problem STS-59-E-I). This
represents a 7.2-sigma difference when compared with the flight data base. The
cause is believed to be associated with a hardware degradation condition that
necessitated plugging three adjacent oxidizer preburner posts prior to STS-59.
The plugging would have created a localized area of low mixture ratio that
affected the Channel A measurement and not the Channel B measurement. The HPOTP
temperatures for SSME I and 2 were satisfactory; and except for the temperature
previously described in this paragraph, SSME 3 temperatures _ere satisfactory.
SSME 1 had two pressure measurements that spiked (Flight Problem STS-59-1-01).
The HPFTP coolant liner pressure spiked at engine start + 83 seconds, and the
fuel system purge pressure spiked at engine start plus 91.5 seconds. The time
and amplitude of these spikes match those caused by ground radar noise.
SSME 1 experienced a 174g peak-to-peak "pop" at engine start plus 1.43 seconds.
This level is Ig below the OFLRSD limit, and as a result, a flatness check of the
preburner faceplate has been recommended.
The hot-gas injection pressure measurement on SSME i and 2 became steady-state
at engine start plus 260 seconds. This phenomenon has been observed on previous
flights, and has been attributed to ice formation in the sensing line.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during each launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices
were armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the
countdown and flight.
As planned, the SR3 S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was turned
off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation
from the Orbiter.
ORBITER sUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was nominal with no in-fllght anomalies
noted.
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During the prelaunch L09 umbilical plate gap setup, the required supply pressure
to obtain 0.25 pslg in :_he gap was 640 psig, which violates the 550-psig maximum
requirement. An exception was issued for this condition, as a visual inspection
did not reveal any leak paths that might cause higher-than-normal supply
pressure. Ve6icle inspections of the umbilical and pyrotechnic canister areas
will be performed.
During both countdowns, LO_ and LH9 loading was performed as planned with no
stop-flows or reverts. No-LCC or 0MRSD violations were noted. Throughout
preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations were detected.
The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the Orbiter aft compartment during
the final countdown occurred shortly after start of fast-fill and was
approximately 163 ppm (corrected), which compares favorably with previous data
for this vehicle.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus
the inventory (planned) loads results in a loading accuracy of -0.02 percent for
_ and -0,01 percent for LO2. Both of these values were within the requiredloading accuracy.
Ascent MPS performance appeared to be completely normal. Data indicate that the
L09 and LH9 pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all net
po§itive section pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight.
Reconstructed data from engine and MPS p=rameters closely matched the actual ET
ullage pressure measurements. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced
during the period of the ullage pressure slump was 13.5 psid.
The gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow control valves (FCVs) performed nominally. All
three FCVs had been refurbished before flight by the vendor. No sluggishness in
the operation of the valves was noted during the flight.
Data from the prelaunch, MECO, post-MECO, and entry/landing events revealed no
anomalous valve movement. All timings were within the required specification
and within the historical data base.
Helium usage during the engine purge was 56.6 Ibm. Data show that the 750-psia
regulator pressure on SSME 2 decreased slightly near the end of the purge
because of low supply pressure, The multiple entry attempts and wave-offs
depleted the bottle supply to a lower-than-normal amount. During the purge, the
supply pressure fell to approximately 700 psi, which is below the regulator
control band. The regulator performance was as expected and no violations
occurred as a result of the lower pressures.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed nominally throughout the flight. A total of 3920.5 ibm of RCS
propellants was consumed during the flight. In addition, during the OMS
interconnect operations, the RCS used 25i7.5 Ibm of 0MS propellants.
During prelaunch operations, oxidizer vapors were released when removing the
universal throat plug adapter (UTPA) from R3A to install the rain cover, and
vapors were noticed behind the rain cover during a prelaunch inspection. Vapors
appeared behind the L4L rain cover similar to L3D. Injector temperatures were
nominal during ascent for all RCS thrusters.
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Four orblt-adjust maneuverswere performed to maintain a repeatable ground track
throughout the mission. The first orbit-adjust firing was performed at
099:15:10:00 G.m.t. (00:04:05:00 MET) using two +X RCS thrusters. The
13.4-second firing produced a AV of 3.2 ft/sec. The second orbit-adjust firing
was performed at 100:12:04:00 G.m.t. (01:00:59:00 MET). The multi-axis RCS
firing lasted 15.048 seconds and resulted in a _V of 3.7 ft/sec. The third
orbit-adjust firing was performed at 102:11:30 G.m.t. (03:00:25 MET). The
firing was 14.02 seconds in duration and provided a aV of 3.3 ft/sec. The
fourth and final orbit-adjust firing was performed at 104:13:46 G.m.t.
(05:02:41 MET). The 13-second firing was retrograde in direction and provided a
aV of 3.1 ft/sec.
The RCS hot fire began at 107:15:08:25 G.m.t. (08:04:03:25 MET) and ended at
107:15:14:10 (08:04:09:10 MET). A review of the thruster data indicated
satisfactory operation of all thrusters.
During the aft RCS redundant circuit verification test after landing, the right
RCS fuel manifold 4 isolation valve did not indicate closed when the switch was
taken to the closed position (Plight Problem STS-59-V-08). The valve was cycled
open, then closed, and then open with the same symptoms of no closed indication
with nominal open indications. The manifold pressure data indicate the valve
was actually closed. Postfllght troubleshooting isolated the failure to the
microswitch in the actuator. The actuator was replaced and the retest was
satisfactory.
Orbital Maneuverin_ Subsystem
The OMS performed nominally during the two maneuvers that occurred in which
7,258.0 ibm of oxidizer and 4,368.0 ibm of fuel were consumed. In addition, a
total of 2517.5 ibm of OMS propellants was used by the RCS during three periods
of interconnect operations.
The OMS-1 maneuver was not required because of the direct insertion trajectory
that was flown. The OMS-2 maneuver was performed at 099:11:40:10.3 G.m.t.
(00:00:35:10.3 MET). The maneuver duration was 100.2 seconds and the AV was
163.0 ft/sec. The resultant orbit was 121.3 by 120.5 nml.
The deorblt maneuver for the first landing opportunity at Edwards Air Force Base
was initiated at 110:16:00:34.9 G.m.t. (11:04:55:34.9 MET). The maneuver was
approximately 135.6 seconds in duration and the aV was 233.7 ft/sec.
During the OMS-2 firing (after the 13.8-second lockout), the left OMS fuel
total-quantlty indication rose steadily to 64 percent. This indication was
biased high approximately 8 percent at the time of launch, and this bias
remained through the deorbit maneuver as the level tracked along the aft probe.
Following the precious flight of this vehicle, th_ aft fuel probe was replaced
because it had been 5iased high for several flights. The forward probe had been
operating correctly. Prior to STS-59, the fuel tank was loaded and the
condition of the forward probe was noted. Data review indicates that there may
be a broken wire in the forward probe of the tank.
Also, immediately following the lockout during the OMS-2 maneuver, the right OMS
oxidizer total-quantlty indication jumped up to 65 percent and then decreased at
a normal rate. During the deorbit firing, the total channel decreased through-
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out the ungageable lockout time period and then shifted down to approximately
18 percent from where it appeared to track normally. Data review indicates that
the forward probe electronics may be t-he cause of the problem. Troubleshooting
of these gagiNg problems will be performed; however, failures of the gaging
system are not uncommon and repair prior to the next flight is not required.
Power Reactant Storase and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem met all
requirements of the mission in providing reactants for the fuel cells and oxygen
for crew breathing. A total of 2929 lb of oxygen and 354 lb of hydrogen was
consumed during the mission. The 118 lbm of oxygen used by the crew for
breathing is included in that total. Reactants remaining at landing could have
sustained the mission for two days at the average power level of 15.1 kW.
At 101:23:05 G.m.t. (02:12:00 MET) the hydrogen (H2) tank 5 check valve did not
reseat as expected after the H2 tank 5 heaters were turned off and the tank 4
heaters were taken to AUTO (Flight Problem STS-59-V-03A). Instead of
I00 percent of the fuel cell reactant being supplied by tank 4, minus the amount
contributed by the other tanks due to boiloff, the open tank 5 check valve
allowed 25 percent of the flow to be supplied by tank 5, based on the quantity
decrease in H2 tanks 4 and 5.
Hydrogen tank 5 was configured for high flow (fuel cell purging) at
103:22:08 G.m.t. (04:11:03 MET) for approximately one hour in an attempt to
clear contamination that may have caused its check valve to fail open. This
attempt was unsuccessful and control was switched back to H_ tank 4. H_ tank 4
continued to be used to depletion. At 104.23.20 G.m.t. (05Y12_15 MET),-the
pressure in H_ tank 4 had decayed down to the tanks 1 and 2 heater-on set point,
even though t_e heaters remained on in tank 4 (because the tank was at the
residual quantity of 2.4 percent). With H9 tanks 1 and 2 controlling the
manifold pressure and feeding the fuel cells and H_ tank 5, the H_ tank 5 check
valve suddenly seated at 105:03.47.49 G.m.t. (05:1_:42:49 MET). The resultant
manifold pressure spike caused by the sudden stop of flow into H2 tank 5 was not
seen by the other tanks, indicating that all of the check valves were closed.
The H_ tank 5 check valve worked nominally for the remainder of the mission, but
since-it failed to check for an extended period of time, the valve was removed
and sent to the vendor for failure analysis.
Beginning at 105:00:23 G.m.t. (05:13:18 MET), the pressure observed in PRSD
H2 tank 2 was higher than usual during several heater cycles on H2 tanks 1 and 2
following the nominal depletion of H2 tank 4 (Flight Problem STS-59-V-03B). H2
tank 2 reached its heater-off set point of 224 psia while H9 tank 1 pressure and
the manifold pressure had only risen to 210 psia. This condition was caused by
the tank 2 outlet check valve being stuck shut. The check valve cracked
nominally for the next two cycles, then on the next cycle temporarily stuck
closed again, After these cycles, the check valve operated nominally for the
rest of the mission. No action will be taken against this check valve.
At 106:16:30 G.m.t, (0?:05:25 MET), with heaters cycling in oxygen (02) tank 3,
the O_ tank 1 check valve Stuck closed (Flight Problem STS-59-V-03C). Since the
heat Ieak into tank 1 was not able to boil off reactants to the manifold, the
pressure in tank i rose about 18 psia. The check valve did not crack at the
normal 3 tO 5 psid, preventing the oxygen from boiling off to the manifold. At
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106:20:54 G.m.t. (07:09:49 MET), the check valve opened at 19 psid and the tank
pressure dropped back down to 833 psia. The 02 tank I check valve operated
properly for the remainder of the mission. Since this check valve has exhibited
similar b@havlor in the past, it will be _eplaced and sent to the vendor for
failure analysis.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem performed nominally in providing
4069 kVh of electrical power at an average power level of 15.1 kW and a load of
495 amperes. The FCP subsystem consumed 354 ibm of hydrogen and 2811 ibm of
oxygen and produced 3165 ibm of water during the mission.
The fuel cell I hydrogen flowmeter indication (V45R0170A) was erratic. This is
the first occurrence of this anomaly for this particular flowmeter, but similar
flowmeters have frequently exhibited this behavior. No action will be taken
until the fuel cell is returned to the vendor for maintenance.
Five fuel cell purges were performed, and these occurred at approximately
00:23:00, 04:11:00, 08:11:00, 09:16:00, and 10:15:00 MET. The third fuel cell
purge of the mission, performed at 107:22:04 G.m.t. (08:10:59 MET), was 96 hours
after the second purge. This was the first time in the Space Shuttle Program
that the maximum interval of 96 hours has been achieved.
The actual fuel cell voltages at the end of the mission were as predicted for
fuel cell I, 0.15 volt above the prediction for fuel cell 2, and 0.2 volt above
the prediction for fuel cell 3.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU performance during the mission was satisfactory with one anomaly
identified. The following table delineates the run-time and propellant
consumption as well as the serial number of each APU flown.
Flight Phase
_scent
FCS checkout
Zntry a
Total a
APU I
Time,
!min:sec
22:20
59:54
82:14
Notes:
(S/N204)
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
52
[ APU 2
I Time,
mln:sec
20:16
12:02
73:50105
157 106:08
(S/N 3.11)
Fuel
consumption,
ib
54
25b
147
APU 3 (S/N4IO)
Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption,
Ib
22:27 56
60:17 117
226 82:44 173
a APU's i, 2, and 3 ran for 15 minutes after landing. The postlandlng
shutdown order was I, 2, and 3, with 12 seconds between I and 2 and 13 seconds
betweenb2 and 3, No hydraulic load tests were performed.
The run-time was extended so that the APU 2 temperatures would be high
enough to verify WSB 2 proper operation.
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Following ascent, the APU 2 lube oil return temperature increased above the
250 °F nominal control:temperature due the lack of lube oil cooling from WSB
system 2 with either the WSB A or B controller. APU 2 was shut down early after
ascent when the APU 2 lube oil outlet temperature reached 328 °F and the bearing
temperature 1 had reached 343 °F. These temperatures did not violate any
limits. This early shutdown pre-empted following the requirements of
Development Test Objective (DTO) 414 for STS-59, which specified a shutdown
order of APU 3, APU I, and APU 2 following ascent. However, the shutdown
sequence of APU 2, APU I, and APU 3 did satisfy the general requirements of
DTO 414. Discussion of this anomaly is found in the Hydraullcs/Water Spray
Boiler Subsystem section of the report.
During first-day operations following ascent at 099:23:19 G.m.t. (00:12:14 MET),
the APU 3 fuel pump drain line temperature 2 measurement (V46TO370A) dropped to
43 °F without the selected heater string cycling on as expected. The fault
detection and annunciation (FDA) limit of 48 °F was previously lowered to 43 °F
in anticipation of the temperature falling below the FDA limit, since this APU's
system A heaters have a history of cycling low. Just before the FDA limit was
exceeded, the APU 3 tank and line heaters were switched from A AUTO to B AUTO at
099:23:20 G.m.t. (00:12:15:00 MET). Immediately following the selection of the
B heater string, the heaters cycled on. Nominal temperatures were observed
after the heaters were switched.
It was suspected that the APU 3 drain line system A heater had not failed, and
to verify this condition, _he APU 3 tank and line heaters were switched from B
AUTO back to A AUTO at approximately 100:15:01 G.m.t. (01:03:56 MET). The APU 3
drain line heaters subsequently cycled on at 100:15:46 G.m.t. (01:04:41 MET),
verifying satisfactory operation of the system A heaters.
APU 2 was used for FCS checkout, starting at 107:14:43 G.m.t. (08:03:38 MET).
APU run-time was 12 minutes 2 seconds and 25 Ib of fuel were consumed. All APU
subsystem parameters were nominal during the checkout.
During the normal pressure rise of APU 2 gearbox GN 9 bottle pressure because of
heat from the APU operation, an abrupt downward shi_t of 5 psi occurred at about
170 psla at a constant rate for about i0 seconds, after which tracking resumed
normally but biased low (Plight Problem STS-59-V-09). After normal peaking and
subsequent decreasing with temperature during soakback, the bottle pressure
suddenly began a 5-psi upward shift at a constant rate for approximately
2 minutes before abruptly resuming to track normally. This same signature was
observed on all three STS-59 runs of APU 2 (S/N 311). A review of previous data
indicates that this occurred during the confidence run for this APU prior to
STS-61 as well as both runs of the APU during the mission. STS-61 was the first
flight of S/N 311 as an improved APU. The cause of this signature is believed
to be instrumentation related, and the APU will be flown as-is.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler SubsTstem
Hydraulics and WSB prelaunch performance during both countdowns was nominal.
During ascent, WSB 1 operated nominally, and WSB 2 and WSB 3 had anomalous
performance. WSB 2 showed no indication of spraying during ascent (Flight
Problem STS-59-V-06). The APU 2 lube oil return temperature increased to
305 "F, well above the nominal 250 "F control temperature, at which time the
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crew switched from WSB controller 2A to VSB controller 2B. No spraying occurred
while operating on:controller 2B as evidenced by the data. The APU 2 lube oil
temperature continued to climb and when it reached 323 °F (APU bearing
temperature = 348 °F), APU 2 was shut down. Approximately 2 minutes after APU
shutdown, the WSB 2 spray logic was deactivated in accordance with normal
procedures. During this 2-minute period, no evidence of spray cooling was found
in the data. As a result of the early shutdown of APU 2, the planned APU
shutdown order (3, I, and 2) was not met. However, the actual shutdown sequence
(APU 2, I, and 3) did satisfy the general requirement for DTO 414. No
back-driving of the speedbrake power drive unit (PDU) was noted.
The lube oli return temperature for APU 3 reached 283 °F before VSB 3 cooling
was noted during ascent. Cooling began while still operating on the WSB 3A
controller and the expected over-cooling condition occurred and was followed by
nominal operation.
About 7 minutes 47 seconds after APU 2 start for FCS checkout, lube oil spray
cooling with the WSB 2B controller occurred when the lube oil return temperature
reached 250 OF, and no obvious over-temperature or delay in cooling was noted.
Approximately 2 1/2 minutes after cooling began, the crew switched to the WSB
2A controller. About 30 seconds later, a minor over-cool condition was observed
with the temperature of the lube oll decreasing to 245 °F, but all other
indicators of APU operation were nominal. This over-cool condition has been
seen before and is not a concern for APU operation. As a result of this
successful test, WSB 2 was used during entry with no constraints.
Hydraulic performance during entry was nominal with the exception of a WSB 1
minor lube oil over-cool condition of 16 °F (I °F more than allowed). The
condition has been observed several times on previous missions, but it is not a
concern. All reservoir quantities, temperatures, and pressures were normal
during entry. Lube oil and hydraulic cooling for WSB 2 and WSB 3 was normal,
and water usage was within specification.
The postlanding checks revealed that the _P indicator on hydraulic system 3 was
tripped, and it is not known whether the condition was caused by excessive
return pressure. This is the fifth incidence of tripping on system 3 on 0V-105.
Evaluation is continuing to determine the cause of the tripping.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
satisfactorily. All data analyzed showed nominal voltage and current
signatures, and no specified limits were exceeded.
Environmental Control and Life Support System
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performed nominally throughout the
mission. The cabin fan aP appeared to be lower than that indicated on STS-61,
the previous flight of OV-105, and this condition has been attributed to the
additional cooling provided to the in-cabin payloads. The ARS avionics bay
water coldplate outlet temperature peaked at 85.2 _F in bay 1, 89.5 °F in bay 2,
and 83.3 "F in bay 3. The ARS avionics bay 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures
peaked at 104.5 °F, 104.5 "F, and 87.0 "F, respectively.
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Two lithium hydroxide (LiOH) canister failures occurred. After performing a
LiOH canister changeout at 102:12:20 G.m.t. (03:01:15 MET), the crew reported
that canister 9 (S/N 224), which had just been removed, was split. There was no
loss of LiOH ,into the cabin atmosphere. The crew also reported that the
canister was not split when installed, and that it was dry both before
installation and after removal. The canister was wrapped and stowed in the LIOH
storage box.
At approximately 108:02:36 G.m.t. (08:15:31 MET), the crew reported that a
second LiOH canister (25) had a split outer shell. This particular LiOH
canister (S/N 285) is from the same lot as the canister that was found split
earlier in this flight. The crew also reported that they had no trouble
removing, bagging or stowing the canister.
There have been two prior canister failures during flight (STS-51 and STS-56),
and the failure analysis concluded that the canister shell material was too thin
due to over-milling. Severe pitting corrosion from the chemical milling process
weakened the LiOH canister shell. The two previous in-flight failures and
canisters 9 and 25 on this flight are all from the same lot of canisters. The
failure potential of the canister shells is a known condition and the decision
was made to fly as-is. Worst case effects of the failure mode were evaluated
and it was determined that the Nomex LiOH bag would contain the LiOH, and the
canister could not become jammed in the ARS.
The active thermal control system (ATCS) operation was satisfactory throughout
the mission with the exception of the flash evaporator system (FES) feedline
heater failure. The ATCS successfully supported payload cooling requirements by
the crew placing both Freon cooling loops (FCLs) in the payload position at
099:13:30 G.m.t. (00:02:25 MET). The FCLs were returned to the interchanger
position at 109:06:43 G.m.t. (09:19:38 MET). For the extension day, FCL 2 was
placed in the payload position from 109:18:26 G.m.t. (10:07:21 MET) to
110:06:49 G.m.t. (010:19:44 MET).
At 103:05:40 G.m.t. (03:18:35 MET), the FES system A accumulator and high-load
feedline temperatures (V63TI892A and V63TI895A) drifted down to ambient (50 to
60 °F) (Flight Problem STS-59-V-04). The feedline heaters are controlled by a
common thermostat which is located on the accumulator line. The Orbiter was
maintained in a warm attitude throughout the flight and as a result, the
temperature of these lines never fell below the FDA limit of 50 °F. At
104:19:08 G.m.t. (05:08:03 MET), the system 2 heaters were activated in
accordance with the normal timeline and performance was nominal for the
remainder of the flight. Postflight testing did not repeat the anomaly.
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through landing plus
26 minutes when ammonia system A was activated using the secondary controller.
The coldsoak lasted longer than usual, and this was possibly caused by the large
uninsulated mass of the SRL-I in the payload bay. Ammonia system A controlled
the Freon.evaporator outlet temperature to 33 °F for 9 minutes at which time
ground equipment began cooling.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performed
normally throughout the duration of the flight. During the redundant component
check, the pressure control Configuration was switched to the alternate system.
Both systems operated nominally.
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The supply water and waste management systems performed normally throughout the
mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and the overboard
dump systems. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between
70 and 10Q OF throughout the mission with the operation of the line heater.
Four supply water dumps were performed at an average dunp rate of
1.41 percent/minute (2.3 ib/min).
Waste water was gathered at the predicted rate. Six waste water dumps were
performed at an average dump rate of 1.95 percent/minute (3.23 Ib/min). The
waste water dump llne temperature was maintained between 52 and 79 °F throughout
the mission with the operation of the line heater.
The waste collection system (WCS) performed adequately throughout the mission
with no anomalies noted.
During the crew debriefing, the crew reported that the grommet at the opening to
the wet trash (Volume F) compartment came out of its retainer and was pushed
into the bag (Flight Problem STS-59-V-II). This same failure mode has been
experienced on a number of flights_ A potential fix is being evaluated that
would bond the grommet at the retainer.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression System
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke generation during the
flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Airlock Support System
Use of the alrlock support system components was not required because there was
no extravehicular activity (EVA). The active-system-monitor parameters
indicated normal output throughout the flight.
Avionics and Software Subsystems
The performance of the integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystems
during all phases of the flight was nominal.
At approximately 100:04:15 G.m.t. (00:17:i0 MET), the crew reported that the
expected audio tone associated with a time-tone message was not heard when
requested via the data processing system (DPS) specialist function 2 (Spec 2)
TIME display. At approximately 101:03:35 G.m.t. (01:16:30 MET), the crew
reported another such occurrence. During one occurrence, the crew was keying a
hand-held microphone, which disables the speaker when the tone was annunciated;
during the other occurrence, the crew was in the middeck and only the flight
deck speaker was powered because of dual shift operations, and as a result, the
crew did not notice the 1-second tone. Data evaluation from these two time
periods shows that the primary avionics software system (PASS) correctly
generated the light and tone.
The SRL-1 payload required tight pointing and low maneuver rates of the on-orbit
digital autopilot (DAP). Prior to flight, a known problem was identified within
the DAP that could allow the Zero Doppler Steering (ZDS) maneuvers to complete
late (up to twice as long as expected) or too soon, resulting in payload
pointing errors as large as 3.5 degrees. Since the maneuvers were to be
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completed continually throughout the flight, a patch was implemented in the
flight software which successfully prevented the precision loss and the
maneuver-completlon dispersions.
At 107:18:59 G.m.t. (08:07:54 MET), the crew attempted to select DAP A, but only
contact 3 was set high. Since contacts I and 2 were set low, the redundancy
management (RM) deselected contact 3. The crew's second attempt to select DAP A
was successful as the remaining two contacts on the push-button were functioning
normally. The crew confirmed that they had depressed the DAP push-button
lightly on the first attempt. This is an explained condition that occurs when
the DAP push-button is not fully depressed, and has been seen on previous
Shuttle missions (STS-4, STS-9, and STS-32).
The three high accuracy inertial navigation system (HAINS) inertial measurement
units (IMUs) as well as t_: _tar trackers performed in an excellent manner.
The FCS performance was nominal throughout the mission. During the FCS
checkout, evidence of transient contamination was noted during the positive
stimuli portion of the secondary actuator checks. When the 9.5 MA stimuli was
put in the rudder channel 3 servo valve, the channel 3 secondary _P was slow to
respond. After an initial increase to 1,100 psia, the pressure slowly dropped
to 700 psia before rapidly increasing to 2,850 psia 1.44 seconds after the
command. The channel bypass was as expected once the pressure rise occurred.
Typically, the pressure rise and subsequent channel bypass should occur nearly
instantaneously (<0.I second). The system performed as expected during the
negative stimuli portion of the test. Following this occurrence, the response
was normal for the remainder of the mission. The anomalous response is
indicative of silting or transient contamination of the flapper stage of the
servo valve. A desilting procedure will be performed during turnaround.
A problem was discovered during deorbit preparations at 109:12:43:44 G.m.t.
(10:01:38:44 MET), when nominally configured general purpose computer (GPC) 4
was processing systems management (SM) software and driving cathode ray tube
(CRT) 4, and GPC 5 was processing backup flight system (BFS) software and
driving CRT 3. An OPS 000 PRO to GPC 4 on CRT 2 was misinterpreted by the
mission operations computer (MOC) as being commanded to the BFS on CRT 3. The
command was actually made on CRT 2 and the SM GPC moded to OPS 0 as commanded,
but the display on the ground showed keystrokes to the BFS. The cause of this
incorrect indication on the ground display was that keystrokes are downlisted
before the downllst header word change in some cases, and the MOC software
interpreted the entry as being on CRT 3 instead of CRT 2.
The displays and controls subsystem performed acceptably in meeting all
requirements placed on it. At 108:13:38 G.m.t. (09:02:33 MET), the crew
reported that the units digit of the Ku-band range/elevation indicator on panel
A2 was not illuminating (Flight Problem STS-59-V-07). The condition was most
probably caused by a failure within the digital display unit, which has been
removed and replaced.
The forward port payload bay floodlight exhibited signs of arcing in the data
and never illumlnated when power was applied at 109:00:02 G.m.t.
(10:12:57 MET). The llght was turned off for the remainder of the mission.
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The crew also reported that the aft port payload bay floodlight did not come up
to full brightness at 110:11:45 G.m.t. (11:00:40 MET) during payload bay door
closure activities. The data in this instance also indicate possible arcing;
however, after several minutes, the light did draw the correct amount of
current and apparently came up to full brightness.
During landing, equivalent airspeed (EAS) dispersions at touchdown exceeded the
expected results from simulations, which had predicted expected dispersions for
a touchdown speed of 205 knots to be +5 to -I0 knots. Preliminary data indicate
a touchdown speed of 215.9 knots gAS. Correcting the EAS for runway distance
dispersion reveals no significant problems with guidance energy management. The
ground speed at touchdown was approximately 228 knots which is approximately
3 knots above the certified ground speed limit of the main tires (225 knots).
By the time the vehicle was stopped, the ribs on both the left and right main
tires had been damaged. The relationship of this damage to the off-nominal
touchdown speed is being evaluated. This condition had no serious safety
implication, but rather is an indication of the continuous learning process with
the vehicles after only 61 actual landings.
The use of the beep or remote hand controller (RIIC) trim derotatlon commands was
tested for the first time on this flight. Derotatlon slapdown rates were in the
predicted range of ground-based simulations; however, the expected steady-state
derotation rate range of 1.8 to 2.1 deg/sec was exceeded by approximately
0.4 deg/sec (2.2 to 2.6 deg/sec). Analysis revealed that performance for both
steady-state and final slapdown rates was within the band of system
uncertainties, but was different enough from the expected values to require
further study of the interaction of hardware and software systems during
derotation. The beep trim initiation did provide a smoother command input and
less dynamic tire loads interaction as expected; nevertheless, the entire area
of slapdown rates is still being investigated for refinements in landing
simulation models and performance sensitivity.
Communications and Trackin_ Subsystems
The communications and tracking subsystem performed nominally throughout the
mission.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver (DTO 700-8) was powered on at
098:22:50 G.m.t. (prior to first launch attempt) and performed nominally for
approximately six hours. At that time, the status bit changed to I where it
remained until the power was cycled following the scrub of the first launch
attempt. Nominally, the status-blt state should toggle between state I and
state O. State i indicates that the receiver is powered and is tracking less
than four satellites. State 0 indicates that the receiver is unpowered or the
receiver is powered and tracking four or more satellites. The receiver operated
nominally for four hours when it was powered on for the second launch attempt,
but then the receiver bit again went to state 1 and remained there.
The receiver power was cycled prior to the second launch attempt; however, the
receiver status bit remained in state 1. At the operational sequence (OPS) 101
to 102 transition (SRB ignition), the receiver state and channel status were
reinitialized. At 099:11:16 G.m.t. (00:00:11 MET), the receiver status
bit switched to O, which indicated that four-satelllte navigation was occurring.
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The GPS receiver status bit changed from state 0 to state 1 at 100:10:43 G.m.t.
(00:23:38 MET) and remained there for the rest of on _rbit period (Plight
Problem STS-59-V-05). Power cycling the preamplifier and the receiver at
approxlmately_103:22:03 G.m.t. (04:10:58 MET) did not recover the stale GPS
status bit. During the deorblt preparations for the first landing opportunity
while transitlonlng from OPS 2 to OPS 3, the receiver state and channel status
were reinitlalized. As a result, the status bit began cycling as expected.
Although there were some longer-than-expected stale periods of the status bit,
the status bit did cycle throughout the remainder of the mission. Postflight,
the fault-log was dumped and reviewed. The GPS internal software was identified
as the most likely cause of the problem. A software update will be incorporated
prior to the next flight of the GPS receiver (STS-68).
Early in the mission during SIR-C data takes (45 Mbps), using Ku-band channel 3
for data transmission, a degradation was noted in the operations recorder data
being dumped simultaneously on Ku-band channel 2 (Plight Problem STS-59-P-01).
During the mission, most of the payload data were being recorded onboard on the
PHRRs. Therefore, the operational workaround was to avoid simultaneous dumps
using channels 2 and 3. This had no mission impact. A limited amount of
troubleshooting performed late in the mission indicates that there was no
interference from channel 2 to channel 3, and channel 2 was degraded only on the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) West-2 South chain. Further
troubleshooting will be performed during turnaround.
At 108:13:38 G.m.t. (09:02:30 MET), the crew reported that the units digit
falled to illuminate in the Ku-band range/elevation indicator on panel A2 and
that the fault light was illuminated (Flight Problem STS-59-V-07). This
indicator is normally used when stowing the Ku-band antenna, but it is not
required to stow the antenna. Postflight troubleshooting isolated the problem
to the Ku-band range/elevation and range rate/azimuth digital display unit. The
unit was removed and replaced.
Instrumentation Subsystems
The operational instrumentation subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout
the mission with the exception of the modular auxiliary data system (MADS)
recorder. The MADS recorder failed during an attempted GPS data-take at
101:23:15 G.m.t. (02:12:10 MET), and all data that were to be recorded on the
MADS thereafter were lost, including on-orbit GPS data and all entry data
(Plight Problem STS-59-V-02). All of the ascent engine data were recorded as
well as a one-half hour GPS test data run early in the mission. Postflight
troubleshooting isolated the failure to the recorder.
Structures and Mechanical SubsTstems
All structures and mechanical subsystems performed satisfactorily during the
mission. The landing and braking data are shown in the table on the following
page.
At 099:11:06 G.m.t. (00:00:01 MET), near the point of maximum aerodynamic
pressure (max q), the left main gear (LMG) door uplock proximity sensor
indicated off for 10 seconds (i.e., door not uplocked) (Plight Problem
STS-59-V-01).. A second sensor, the LMG uplock indication, did not change state.
Both of these indications provide a signal to the LMG/D00R UPLOCK discrete, and
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Parameter
Main gear touchdown
Nose gear touchdown
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
From
threshold,
ft
1664
7067
Speed,
keas
215.4
160.7
Braking initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Sink rate, ft/sec
"3.5
n/a
Pitch rate,
de_/sec
n/a
3.80
107.6 knots (keas)
28.3 seconds (sustained)
10,691 feet
53.7 seconds
22 (concrete) at Edwards
222,030.0 lb (landing estimate)
Brake sensor location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
RiGht-hand outboard 4
Peak
pressure,
psia
1284
1296
1272
1140
1116
984
936
Brake assembly
Left-hand outboard
Left-hand inboard
Right-hand inboard
Right-hand outboard
* Intentionally inoperative brake pressure channel.
Energy,
million ft-lb
13.09
29.77
23.99
19.64
therefore, the discrete also went from uplocked to not uplocked. At the time of
the indication, the data rate for the discrete was 1 Hz, and there were no
apparent disturbances in either ac or dc power. The anomaly did not recur and
the proximity switch rigging will be checked postflight. A similar event
occurred for 12 seconds on STS-9 and was attributed to vibration at max q as
well as the close tolerance on the rigging of the proximity switch. Postflight
troubleshooting showed that the LMG door proximity switch required re-rigging.
It was also determined that the right main gear (RMG) door proximity switch also
required re-rigglng.
Drag chute performance appeared to be satisfactory with no off-nomlnal wear or
instability noted. All drag chute hardware was recovered and no signs of
abnormal operation were noted. The failure of the MADS recorder will prevent
the determination of loads during drag chute deployment and operation.
The postlanding inspection revealed that the inboard tires on the left and right
main landing gear (MLG) sustained damage on the second rib from the respective
MLG strut (i.e., outboard on the inboard tires) (Flight Problem STS-59-V-IO).
The cause of the damage, which was the worst seen with the commercial tread
material in four landings on the concrete runway at Edwards Air Force Base. The
cause of the damage is believed to have resulted from a combination of the high
main landing gear touchdown velocity, a high-speed maneuver to the runway
centerline and low-speed braking without antiskid protection.
!
q
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The crew hatch outer window sustained an apparent micrometeorite impact. The
damage site measured 1/4 inch in diameter and is located at the seven o'clock
position of the window, one inch from the edge tiles. The window has been
returned to Jqhnson Space Center (JSC) for &nalysis. Also, window 6 had one
impact crater (0.029 inch by 0.023 inch by 0.0019 inch deep). The window will
be replaced.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited typical hazing. Less-than-normal haze was
present on the other forward-facing windows (I, 2, 5, and 6). Surface wipes
were taken from all windows for laboratory analysis, the report of which will be
in separate documentation.
Integrated Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems. Active load
relief on the outboard elevons was experienced at approximately Mach= 0.93 for
the fourth time in six flights of OV-105. This load relief is caused by a shock
traversing the upper surface of the elevon and causing a momentary spike in the
elevon hinge moment. This condition is not considered anomalous; however, the
condition is not predicted in the data base that includes only discrete Mach
numbers of M = 0.90 and M = 1.05 in this regime.
During entry, DTO 254 - Part 2 "Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification" was
performed during final approach at M = 0.55. The control-surface position and
rate data as well as angle-of-attack data compare well with preflight
performance predictions.
The integrated aerodynamic and plume heating was nominal during ascent; however,
the SRB plume impinged on the gaseous oxygen vent arm on the launch pad and
caused moderate damage to the arm. The vent arm was damaged on the STS-38 and
STS-42 missions plus several other flights.
The prelaunch thermal interface temperatures were within design limits with no
excessive temperatures noted on the vehicle.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating was within limits, but reflects a high heat load. All
structural temperatures and structural temperature rise rates were within the
experience base, and the structural temperature rise on the left and right wings
was symmetrical and within the experience base. The TPS damage was also well
within the experience base. The loss of MADS data during entry prevented the
normal evaluation of the aerothermodynamics.
.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermal control subsystem performed satisfactorily in maintaining all
temperatures within the operational limits.
The FES system A accumulator and high-load feedline system I heater failed off.
This anomaly is discussed in the Environmental Control and Life Support System
section of this report.
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Thermal Protection Subsystem
The TPS performed satisfactorily. Structural temperature response data show
that the @ntry heating was above average, and the TPS performed as designed in
preventing heating damage during ascent and entry. This above-average entry
heating was expected, considering the high inclination (57 °) of the flight, plus
the Orbiter was on the descending node and the Orbiter was heavier than usual
during entry. The overall boundary layer transition from laminar flow to
turbulent flow can not be determined because of the failure of the MADS
recorder. Based on the available operational instrumentation (OI) data,
transition was non-symmetric on the vehicle.
The postlanding inspection of the TPS showed a total of 77 hits of which 19 had
a major dimension of one inch or greater. A comparison of these numbers with
statistics from previous missions indicates that both the total number of hits
and the number of hits with a major dimension of one inch or greater were less
than average.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 38 hits, of which II had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. A total of 16 hits, in two clusters of eight,
occurred just aft of the hydrogen umbilical. The most notable damage occurred
to a group of four tiles on the body flap, just aft of the hinge line. The
total damage occurred over four tiles, two of which were damaged in an area
4 inches by 1 inch by 3/8-inch deep and 3 inches by 2 inches by 3/8-inch deep.
The nose landing gear door (NLGD) thermal barriers were in good condition, with
a small 2-1nch debonded area on the forward portion of the NLGD centerline
thermal barrier.
The ET/Orbiter separation devices appeared to have functioned properly except
for EO-2, which did not close properly. No flight hardware was found on the
runway below the umbilicals after the ET doors were opened, but a loose wave
spring was found resting against a Hi-Lock fastener on the LH9 umbilical door.
The wave spring is part of the gO-2 pyrotechnic separation deSice.
The number of tile damage sites on the base heat shield, attributable to the
flame arrestment sparkler system, was less than normal with a majority of the
hits occurring in the areas between engines 1-2 and 1-3, Three tile damage
sites observed on the vertical tail stinger are attributable to drag chute
deployment. Six toughened unipiece fibrous insulation (TUFI) tiles located on
the triangular carrier panel between and below SSME 2 and 3 sustained no damage.
This was the first flight of the TUPI tiles. The dome-mounted heat shield
closeout blankets on all three SSMEs were in excellent condition.
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
The flight cr_w equipment(FCE)/government furnished equipment operated
acceptably, except for the galley water dispensing system.
The crew reported at 101:09:20 G.m.t. (01:22:15 MET) that gas bubbles were
present in the galley hot and cold water (Flight Problem STS-59-F-01). Over
the next several days, numerous in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedures were
developed in an attempt to characterize and resolve the problem of gas in the
galley water. The results of the initial troubleshooting activities performed
by the crew indicated that no gas was being introduced into the galley water
supply by the Orbiter supply water system. Also, the crew reported that they
had observed what appeared to be a "venturi effect" when filling food and drink
containers with water. The crew had gone to a configuration where cold water
was obtained from the chilled water outlet using the contingency water dispenser
(CWD). The crew found that there were more bubbles present when filling
containers at a high flow rate. This venturi-effect theory was tested by having
the crew place a globule of water around the needle/septum assembly as an empty
drink bag was filled with water. The globule was drawn into the bag when using
a high flow rate, which supported the theory.
The crew performed several IFM procedures to alleviate the problem of gas in the
galley water. The first procedure involved sliding three pieces of rubber onto
the galley rehydration station (RHS) needle and two pieces on the CWD needle to
create a tighter seal between the package septum and the needle. The crew
reported that the IFM worked well at low flow rates and appeared to decrease the
number of bubbles present in the water. The crew decided to continue getting
hot water from the galley through the RHS needle and cold water from the chilled
water outlet through the CND needle. This configuration allowed the crew to
continue obtaining relatively gas-free drinking water at low flow rates.
The crew performed an additional IFM procedure which added a hard-tip straw to
the needle of the CWD. The needle is end-ported, as opposed to the side-port of
the RHS needle, and the CWD needle demonstrated the venturi effect in ground
tests performed during the flight. The crew found that this change was an
excellent fix to the venturi effect that had been experienced during previous
uses of the CWD.
Subsequent IFM procedures were developed to test for gas in the galley water and
to purge the galley, if gas was noted. The procedures also required a test for
the venturi effect at the RliS needle (not being seen in ground tests), and if
the venturi effect was observed, steps to minimize its effect at the RHS needle.
ii However,H n die.|_i at the R See
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The IFM procedures for gas in the galley water were completed, and no gas
bubbles were detected in either the chilled or hot galley water. Consequently,
a galley purge was not performed. Initial results of the IFM procedure for
determining if the venturi effect existed at the RHS needle were inconclusive.
further troubleshooting did show that the venturi effect also existed
For the remainder of the flight, the crew maintained the
configuration in which chilled water was obtained from the chilled water outlet
t t e WD edle (modified with the hard-tip straw), and hot water _as
obtained from the galley through the RHS needle (modified with the rubber
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The crew reported that the lens sequence light of a Linhof camera was on and it
should have been off (Flight Problem STS-59-F-02). No shutter motion occurred
when the camera was triggered. Malfunction procedures were unsuccessful in
recovering camera operation. The problem was isolated to the camera body
(S/N 1003) and the camera was stowed for the remainder of the mission. The
second Linhof camera remained available for use.
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REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
The remote manipulator system (RMS) was flown on this mission but was not
planned for use nor was it used. The manipulator position mechanisms were
rolled out to provide clearance for the SRL-I when it was being moved into
operational position.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
The cargo.integration hardware operated satisfactorily with no anomalies
identifie_.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
A total of 16 development test objectives (DTOs) and 14 detailed supplementary
objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the STS-59 mission. Data were obtained on
ll of the 16 DTOs and all of the DSOs.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 254 - Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification - Doublets were performed as
planned during entry with the data recorded and downlinked for postflight
analysis. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the
results will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 301D - Ascent Wing Structural Capability - This was a data-only DTO, and
data were recorded during ascent for this DTO. These data have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 305D - Ascent Con_partment Venting Evaluation - This was a data-only DTO, and
data were recorded during ascent for this DT0. These data have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation_ and the results will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - This was a data-only DTO,
and the failure of the MADS recorder prevented the recording of any data for
this DTO.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - This was a data-only DTO, and the
failure of the MADS recorder prevented the recording of any data for this DTO.
DTO 312 - External Tank Thermal Protection System Performance - A total of 36
exposures of the STS-59 ET was acquired using the Nikon camera with a 300 mm
lens and a 2X extender (Methods 1 and 3). The exposure was good on all frames,
but the focus was variable.
A probable divot is visible on the -Y axis of the ET at the LH9 tank/intertank
interface below the forward left SRB attachment point. A probable divot is also
visible on the LH 9 tank TPS aft of the left leg jackpad of the forward bipod.
Four probable divbts are visible on the -Z side of the ET (far side) along the
LH2 tank/intertank interface.
Seven minutes of excellent quality video of the STS-59 ET (after separation) was
acquired from the crew compartment. Typical charring on the ET aft dome is
visible. The SRB BSM burn scars on the LO9 tank appeared similar to previous
missions. Four prominent white marks (probably divots) are visible on the far
side (-Z) of the ET along the LH 2 intertank interface. A white piece of debris
(probably frozen hydrogen) is visible traveling with the ET. The tumble rate of
the ET was calculated from the video to be 0.97 deE/see.
DTO 414 - Auxiliary Power Unit Shutdown Test - The planned shutdown sequence for
this DTO (APU 3, APU 1, and APU 2) was not performed due to the freeze-up of
3O
WSB 2, and the resulting early shutdown of APU 2 following ascent. The
alternate sequence:was performed (APU 2, APU 3, and APU I), and the data were
downlinked for analysis. There was no indication of speedbrake power drive unit
back-drivlng. The results of the analysis will be reported in separate
documentation.
DT0 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System - This DTO was not performed as the drag
chute was used in an operational manner rather than as required by the DTO.
Also, because of the MADS recorder failure, data for loads determination were
not recorded.
DT0 653 - Evaluation of the MK I Rowing Machine - This DTO was performed and the
crew has debriefed the sponsor. The results of the evaluation will be reported
in separate documentation.
DTO 656 - Payload and General Support Computer Single Event Upset Monitoring -
This DTO was performed and the results have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 663 - Acoustical Noise Dosimeter Data - The crew collected data as required
for this DTO. These data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and
reporting in separation documentation.
DTO 664 - Cabin Temperature Survey - Data were collected by the crew for this
DTO. These data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of
that evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 665 - Acoustical Noise Sound Level Data - Data were collected for this DTO,
and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of
the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 674 - Thermoelectric Liquid Cooling System Evaluation - The equipment for
this DTO was set Up for launch and entry. The crew evaluation of this equipment
will be given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will
be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 700-8 - Global Positioning System Development Flight Test - The GPS receiver
was powered on at 098:22:50 G.m.t. (prior to first launch attempt) and performed
nominally for approximately six hours. At that time, the status bit toggled to
state 1 where it remained until the power was cycled following the scrub of the
first launch attempt. Nominally, the status-bit state should toggle between
state 1 and state O. State 1 indicates that the receiver is powerc_ and
tracking less than four satellites. State 0 means that the receiver is
unpowered or _he receiver is powered and tracking four or more satellites. The
receive: operated nominally for four hours when it was powered on for the second
2a-n_n attempt, but the receiver bit again went to state 1 and remained there.
The receiver power was cycled prior to the second launch attempt; however, the
receiver status bit remained in state 1. At the OPS 101 to 102 transition (SRB
ignition), the receiver state and channel status _rere reinitialized. At
099:11:16 G.m.t. (00:00:11 MET), the receiver status bit switched to 0, which
indicated that four-satellite navigation was occurring.
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The GPS receiver status bit changed from state 0 to state 1 at 100:10:43 G.m.t.
(00:23:38 MET) and remained there throughout the on-orbit period (Flight Problem
STS-59-V-05). Power cycling the preamplifier and the receiver at approximately
103:22:03 G.mtt_ (04:10:58 MET) did not recover the stale GPS status bit.
During the deorbit preparations for the first landing opportunity while
transitioning from OPS 2 to OPS 3, the receiver state and channel status were
reinitialized. As a result, the status bit began cycling as expected. Although
there were some longer-than-expected stale periods of the status bit, the status
bit did cycle throughout the remainder of the mission. During postflight
turnaround operations, the receiver fault-log was dumped and reviewed.
Since most of the on-orbit data as well as all of the entry data were lost
because of the MADS failure, this DTO was not completed. The data collected
were given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will
be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - Wind conditions were not suitable to
satisfy the requirements of this DTO.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 326 - Window Impact Observations - This DSO was completed by the crew. The
crew reported that the egress hatch window had a micrometeorite impact crater
about 1/4 inch in diameter in the lower left quadrant at the 7 o'clock position,
about one inch from the edge tiles. The window has been returned to JSC for
analysis.
DSO 483 - Back Pain in Microgravity - The crew provided data on this DSO to the
sponsor. The analysis of these data will be published in a separate report.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crew Members - Data for this DSO were
collected from the crew during preflight and postflight operations. These data
will be evaluated by the sponsor, and the results will be published in separate
documentation.
DS0 488 - Measurement of Formaldehyde Using Passive Dosimetry - Data were
collected for this DSO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be published in a separate
report.
DSO 603B - Orthostatlc Function during Entry, Landing, and Egress - Data were
collected for this DSO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of this evaluation will be published in separate
documentation.
.
[ DSO 604 - Vlsual-Vestlbular Integration as a Function of Adaptation - Data were
| collected throughout the flight for this DSO. These data have been given to the
| sponsor for evaluation, and the results of that evaluation will be published in
If separate documentation.
DSO608 - Effects of Space Flight on Aerobic and Anaerobic Metabolism During
Exercise - Data were collected for this DSO. These data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation, and the results of that evaluation will be published in
separate _odumentatlon.
DSO 611 - Air Monitoring Instrument Evaluation and Atmosphere Characterization
(Microbial Air Sampler-ll Configuration) - Data were collected with the
Microbial Air Sampler (MAS) -II, and these data have been given to the sponsor
for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DSO 624 - Preflight and Postflight Measurement of Cardiorespiratory Responses to
Submaximal Exercise - Data were collected prior to the flight and after the
flight as well as during exercise sessions throughout the flight. These data
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of that
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 626 - Cardiovascular and Cerebrovascular Responses to Standing Before and
After Space Flight - Data were collected for this DSO, and these data have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 802 - Educational Activities - The crew accomplished the requirements of
this DSO. The data for this DSO have been given to the sponsor for evaluation,
and the results of that evaluation will be published in separate documentation.
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - The crew accomplished the requirements of
this DSO. The data (video tapes) are being reviewed by the sponsor, and any
documentation of the results will be in a separate report.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - The crew accomplished the
requirements of this DSO. The data are being reviewed by the sponsor, and any
documentation of the results will be in a separate report.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - The crew accomplished all requirements
of this DSO and provided many excellent pictures of Earth for evaluation. The
sponsor is evaluating the photographs, and any documentation of the results will
be in separate docdmentation.
PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
0_ launch day, 24 videos of the launch and ascent operations were reviewed, and
anomalies were noted. Following launch day, 55 films of the launch and
_scent uperations were also reviewed. No anomalies were identified from the
review of these films.
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ON-ORBITPHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
No formal review of the on-orbit photography was requested, except for the
DTO 312 - ET ;PS Performance - photography and video taken after ET separation
by the crew. The results of that review are reported in the Development Test
Objectives Section of this report.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
Four videos plus NASA Select (composite of all other video images) and 15 films
of the landing operations at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) were received
and reviewed for anomalies. No anomalies were identified.
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TABLE I.- STS-59 SEOUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
%
IAPU Activation
SRB HPU Activation a
Main Propulsion System
Start a
SRB Ignition Command
Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
(lift-off)
Throttle Up to
100 Percent Thrust a
Throttle Down to
67 Percent Thrust a
Maximum Dynamic
Pressure (q)
Throttle Up to
104 Percent Thrust a
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psi a
End SRM Action a
SRB Separation Command
SRB Physical
Separation a
Throttle Down for
3g Acceleration a
3g Acceleration
Throttle Down to
6" Percent Thrust a
MECO
Engine Shutdown a
MECO
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU system A start command
LH HPU system B start command
RH HPU system A start command
RII HPU system B start command
Engine 3 start command accepted
Engine 2 start command accepted
Engine 1 start command accepted
SRB ignition command to SRB
099:11:00:10.09
099:11:00:11.91
099:11:00:13.25
099:11:04:32.090
099:11:04:32.250
099:11:04:32.410
099:11:04:32.570
099:11:04:53.445
099:11:04:53.580
099:11:04:53.711
099:11:05:00.020
099:11:05:03:886
099:11:05:03.900
099:11:05:03.912
099:11:05:27.406
099:11:05:27.421
099:11:05:27.432
099:11:05:52
099:11:06:00.847
099:11:06:00.861
099:11:06:00.873
099:11:06:58.660
099:11:06:59.020
099:11:07:01.110
099:11:07:01.200
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine i command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic
pressure
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
LE SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
SRB separation command flag
LE rate APU A turbine speed LOS
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine I command acceptea
Total load factor
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Command flag
Engine 3 command accept
Engine 2 command accept
Engine 1 command accept
Confirm flag
099:11:07:04
099:11:07:06.140
099:11:07:06.140
099:11:12:28.852
099:11:12:28.868
099:11:12:28.882
099:11:12:34.6
099:11:13:26.773
099:11:13:26.789
099:11:13:26.804
099:11:13:33
099:11:13:33.053
099:11:13:33.069
099:11:13:33:084
099:11:13:34
aMSFC supplied data
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TABLE I.- STS-59 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)
Even t
IET Separation
!APU Deactivation
OMS-I Ignition
:0MS-1 Cutoff
!OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
Payload Bay Doors Open
Flight Control
System Checkout
APU Start
APU Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
iPayload Bay Doors
Reopen
Payload Bay Doors Close
Description
ET separation comman'd flag
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close I
PLBD right close 1
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
PLBD left close 1
Actual time,
G.m.t.
099:11:13/53
099:11:20:27.51
099:11:22:30.42
099:11:22:39.94
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
099:11:40:10.4
099:11:40:10.6
099:11:41:50.6
099:11:41:50.6
099:12:32:10
099:12:33:28
Deorblt Maneuver
Ignition
(Second Time) PLBD right close 1
APU Activation For APU-2 GG chamber pressure
Entry APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bl-prop valve
position
Right engine bl-prop valve
position
Deorbit Maneuver Cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bl-prop valve
position
Entry Interface (40OK) Current orbital altitude
above reference ellipsoid
Blackout Ends Data locked at high sample
rate
I07:14:42:59.76
107:14:55:02.25
109:12:12:54
109:12:14:37
109:16:38:01
109:16:39:20
110:11:50:23
110:11:51:50
110:15:55:41.20
110:16:09:24.65
110:16:09:26.52
110:16:00:35.1
110:16:00:35.3
110:16:02:50.7
110:16:02:50.7
110:16:22:12
No blackout
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TABLEI.- STS-59SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded)
_vent
Terminal Area Energy
Management
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Deploy
Nose Landing Gear
Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheels Stop
APU Deactivation
Description
Major mode change (305)
LH MLG tire pressure
RH MLG tire pressure
LH MLG weight on wheels
RH MLG weight on wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts
NLG tire pressure
NLG ',ITon Wheels -I
Drag chute jettison 1CP Volts
Velocity with respect to
runway
APU-I GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Actual time,
G.m.t.
110:16:48:22
110:16:54:30
110:16:54:30
110:16:54:30
110:16:54:30
110:16:54:41.5
110:16:54:46
110:16:54:46
110:16:55:11.8
110:16:55:23
110:17:09:19.13
110:17:09:31.25
110:17:09:43.96
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DOCUMENTSOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data
for this mission report, the following list is provided.
i.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I0.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Flight Requirements Document
Public Affairs Press Kit
Customer Support Room Daily Reports
MER Daily Reports
MER Mission Summary Report
MER Quick Look Report
MER Problem Tracking List
MER Event Times
Subsystem Manager Reports/inputs
MOD Systems Anomaly List
MSFC Flash Report
MSFC Event Times
MSFC Interim Report
Crew Debriefing comments
Shuttle Operational Data Book
J
A-1
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The follo¥ing is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions
as these items are used in this document.
APL Applied Physics Laboratory
' APU auxiliary power unit
ARPCS atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
ARRL/AMSAT American Radio Relay League/Amateur Radio Satellite Corporation
" '-:
i ARS atmospheric revitalization system
i.: ATCS active thermal control subsystem
: BFS backup flight system
BSM booster separation motor
CONCAP-IV Consortium for Materials Development in Space Complex Autonomous
i Payload-IV
CRT cathode ray tube
CWD contingency water dispenser
DAP digital autopilot
deg/sec degree per second
DFRC Dryden Flight Research Center
_P differential pressure
DPS data processing system
DSO Detailed Supplementary Objective
DTO Development Test Objective
f=:: AT differential time
_i, _V differential velocity
EAS equivalent air speed
EPDC electrical power distribution and control subsystem
[ e.d.t, eastern daylight time
I' i ET External Tank /
ETA External Tank attachment
/
EVA extravehicular activity
: FCE flight crew equipment ;
; FCL freon coolant loop
FCP fuel cell powerplant
:..... FCS flight control system
FCV flow control valve
FDA fault detection annunciation
FES flash evaporator system i
ft/sec feet per second
GAS Getaway Special _.
' GFE Government furnished equipment r_
GH 2 gaseous hydrogen
,_ G.m.t. Greenwich mean time
gaseous oxygen
GO_ general purpose computer
GPS Global Positioning System
hydrogen
H_INS High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System
HPFTP high pressure fuel turbopump
_ HPOTP high pressure oxidizer turbopu,_p
ICD Interface Control Document
B-I
IEA
IFM
IMU
Isp
JPL
JSC
keas
KSC
kV
kwh
Ibm
LCC
LESC
LMG
LO
lu_e
MADS
MAPS
MAS
max q
Mbps
MCC
MECO
MET
Mir
MLG
MOC
MPS
NASA
NLGD
nmi •
NPSP
NSTS
OMRSD
OMS
OPS
PASS
PHRR
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
RCS
RHC
RHS
RM
RMG
RMS
RSRM
RTLS
integrated electronics assembly
in-flight maintenance
inertial measurement unit
spe'cific impulse
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
knots equivalent air speed
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt hours
pound mass
Launch Commit Criteria
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
liquid hydrogen
lithium hydroxide
left main gear
liquid oxygen
lubrication
modular auxiliary data system
Measurement of Air Pollution from Satellites
Microbial Air Sampler
maximum dynamic pressure
megabits per second
Mission Control Center
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
Russian Space Station
main landing gear
Mission Operations Computer
main propulsion system
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nose landing gear door
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
National Space Transportation System
oxygen
operational instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
operational sequence
primary avionics software system
Payload High Rate Recorder
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
power reactant storage and distribution
reaction control subsystem
rotation hand controller
rehydration station
redundancy management
right main gear
remote manipulator system
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return to Launch Site (abort)
B-2
?
p
/
/
:I
S&A
SAREX-II
SIR-C
SLF
SM
S/N,s/n
SRB
SRL-I
SRSS
SSME
STL-A, -B
STL/NIH-C
STS
TDRS
TFS
TUFI
TVC
UTPA
VFT-4
WCS
WSB
XSAR
ZDS
safe and arm
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experlment-II
Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (band)
Shuttle Landing Facility
systems management
serial number
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Radar Laboratory-I
Shuttle Range Safety System
Space Shuttle main engine
Space Tissue Loss -A, -B
Space Tissue Loss/Natlonal Institute of Health - Cells
Space Transportation System
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
thermal protection subsystem/thermal protection system
toughened unipiece fibrous insulation
thrust vector control
universal throat plug adapter
Visual Function Tester-4
Waste Collection System
water spray boiler
X (band) Synthetic Aperture Radar
Zero Doppler Steering
N
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